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The Irony of Health Care’s Public Option 
 
Allison K. Hoffman 





As the 2020 Democratic primaries heated up in September 2019, the Center for 
Deliberative Democracy gathered 523 voters, designed to be a representative sample of the 
electorate, in a room in Dallas, Texas for three days for an experiment called “America in One 
Room.”1 Researchers pre-polled the participants for their views on a range of controversial 
political issues, from immigration to the environment to health care. Then, over the weekend, 
these 523 “citizen delegates” immersed in conversation in small groups and plenary sessions 
and with field experts and candidates on these topics. At the end, they were asked their views 
again. On some topics their views changed wildly from beginning to end. One where it did not 
was health care’s public option. At the beginning, just over 67 percent favored the idea that 
“[e]veryone should be able to buy a public plan like Medicare,” and at the end just over 71 
percent did. With asked the same idea with respect to people age 55 or older, the idea was 
even more popular: 72 percent at the start and 78.5 percent at the end.2 People love the idea 
of a public health insurance option.  
 
Yet, this idea might be more popular that warranted. At least a half century old, it has 
never had its day in the limelight. This chapter explains why if that moment ever comes, the 
public option will fall short of expectations that it will provide a differentiated, meaningful 
alternative and will spur health insurance competition.  
 
Health care’s public option bubbled up in its best-known form in California in the early 
2000s and got increasing mainstream attention in the lead up to the 2010 health reform, the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA).3 Although it was not adopted into the ACA, 
the idea has reemerged with vigor once again as a cure to ACA shortcomings.  
 
When people talk about health care’s public option, they mean a public health 
insurance plan, typically based on Medicare, that can compete in the market against private 
health insurance offerings. In their book, The Public Option, Ganesh Sitaraman and Anne Alstott 
refer to this type as a competitive public option, which they describe as having two key 
characteristics: that this option, first, “guarantees access to important services at a controlled 
 
1 Center for Deliberative Democracy, America in One Room (2019), at 
https://cdd.stanford.edu/2019/america-in-one-room/.  
2 Center for Deliberative Democracy, A1R Results (2020), at https://cdd.stanford.edu/mm/2019/10/A1R-
Results-Participants-Overall-Issues-Scale-Collapsed-Oct2.pdf  
3 Helen A. Halpin & Peter Harbage, The Origins and Demise of the Public Option, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1117 
(2010).  
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price” and, second, coexists with private provision.4 In this vein, proponents have argued that a 
public health insurance option could deliver better cost-control than private insurance, while 
also being able to offer members a broad choice of providers and quality control.5  
 
Health care’s public option died in the 2010 legislative process, but had it been enacted, 
it would have faced serious obstacles to produce the results its architects hoped. The 
assumption that people will select the public option if it is better than other options is belied by 
mounting body of empirical literature showing how we struggle when choosing among health 
insurance options. Even more, political thorniness would almost certainly have prevented the 
public option from being a clear best alternative, which would have further impeded its ability 
to stand out in the crowd and to move the needle on the price and quality. 
 
This chapter argues that for a public health insurance option to have the kind of 
transformative potential that Sitaraman and Alstott hope for from public options--to promote 
greater health equity and freedom--it needs to be more than an option among many, a 
competitive public option. It must be designed in a way that does not rely on people weighting 
it against other options available and selecting it over the competition when it is the best.  
 
This chapter examines possibilities for health care’s public option in three parts. It first 
explains the theory behind the ACA version of a competitive public option. It then considers the 
challenges this competitive public option would have faced had it become policy reality. Finally, 
it examines more effective ways that public health insurance might be integrated into a 
public/private hybrid system to achieve greater health equity.  
 
II. The “Classic” Health Care Public Option 
 
A. The History 
 
To understand why the public option emerged, and why it has struggled to gain traction, 
it is helpful to recount the development of health insurance in the United States. This well-worn 
story is worth revisiting because it is still salient.  
 
The United States is unique among OECD nations when it comes to paying for health 
care, and not in a good way. Most countries’ systems for health care financing grew up in the 
early- to mid-20th century as medical care became more advanced and more expensive than 
most people could afford on their own.6 In Europe, what emerged were public systems of 
health care finance in two forms, often characterized broadly as Beveridge and Bismarckian 
 
4GANESH SITARAMAN & ANNE L. ALSTOTT, THE PUBLIC OPTION 27 (2019).  They explain: “Citizens can rely on the 
public option but also can turn to the marketplace for additional choices, combining public and private options in 
ways that work best for them.” Id. at 23.  
5 JACOB S. HACKER, INSTITUTE FOR AMERICA’S FUTURE, THE CASE FOR PUBLIC PLAN CHOICE IN NATIONAL HEALTH REFORM 3 
(2008).  
6 PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE __ (1982).  
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systems.7 The Beveridge approach was direct provision of health care by the government, as in 
England, where the government owns hospitals and employs medical professionals—aka 
“socialized medicine.” Bismarckian systems, or social insurance, are ones where the 
government finances health care but the providers can be public or private. Over time, 
countries in Europe and beyond, such as Canada, developed variations on these themes. At the 
core, however, these systems embraced the basic idea that the government would take a 
central role in ensuring access to affordable health care for the entire population.  
 
The U.S. charted a wholly different path. The beginning upsurge of health insurance in 
the United States was initiated by industry itself. As medical care became both more effective 
and expensive, people increasingly sought it. Hospitals feared not being paid for their work if 
they relied on patients to pay cash for services, nor did they want to have to confirm the 
financial solvency of every patient prior to caring for them. 8 Hospitals thus created pre-paid 
health care funds, beginning with Baylor University Hospital in the 1920s, that guaranteed 
people access to medical care up to a certain level, with pre-payment.9 These plans spread and 
eventually took on the name Blue Cross. Within a short period, Blue Shield followed, offering a 
similar a structure for monthly prepayment of fees to groups of physicians in turn for 
guaranteed access of outpatient care. Unlike the health insurance of today, the Blues embraced 
some of the solidaristic characteristics that define systems elsewhere in the world, like charging 
all members of a community the same rate for membership regardless of their personal 
characteristics or health status.  
 
A second—and the most defining—major development in U.S. was the rise of employer-
sponsored health insurance (ESI) during and after World War II. Increased reliance on 
employers as a source of health coverage in the U.S. coincided with the moment that many 
other countries were doubling down on the government’s role. In England, for example, during 
WWII the government built health infrastructure to deal with an unmet need for medical 
services and this infrastructure served as the beginning of the National Health Service, 
established at the end of the war.10  
 
In the U.S., in contrast, in the years during and especially after WWII, ESI surged, 
bolstered by several public policies. A commonly-told story is that the trend began with wage 
freezes during the war prompting employers to compensate with benefits instead of cash 
wages, but the growth in these plans was relatively small in this period.11 More consistent with 
the timing of a major upsurge in adoption of ESI were a 1945 federal rule that required 
employers to leave wartime health benefits in place, a 1949 federal rule allowing unions to 
bargain for health benefits, and most importantly a 1954 rule by the Internal Revenue Service 
 
7 Id. at __.  
8 Id. at __ 
9 Id. at __ 
10 Donald W. Light, Universal Health Care: Lessons From the British Experience, 93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 25, 26 
(2003). 
11 David Blumenthal, Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance in the United States—Origins and Implications, 
355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 82, 83 (2006). 
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excluding dollars spent on health benefits by employers and employees from taxes.12 This 
meant, by one estimate, that a dollar of compensation in cash wages only cost employers an 
average of $.66 if spent on health benefits. With all of these factors, ESI and the centrality of 
private insurance took hold. Today, half of all Americans have insurance through an employer.13  
 
Public financing however maintained a key role. It began in small scale in the Veterans 
Health Administration and Indian Health Services. In 1965, after decades of attempts at 
universal, public health coverage, Medicare and Medicaid were signed into law by President 
Johnson. These programs established public programs to pay for medical care for populations 
seen as vulnerable and also least likely to have access to ESI—the elderly (Medicare) and poor 
children, pregnant women, and people with disabilities (Medicaid).  
 
People who didn’t qualify for a form of public coverage and who didn’t have private 
coverage available through an employer had limited options.14 Some people could access 
charity care. Others paid out-of-pocket for health care, although doing so for anything other 
than the simplest care was out of the reach of most people. A final pathway was to buy health 
insurance directly from an insurer in the individual, or nongroup, insurance market, and doing 
so was thorny. In the individual market, insurers underwrote applicants and deemed many 
people with prior health problems as risky. Six to seven percent of the non-elderly population 
(about 15 million people) had individual-market coverage prior to the passage of the ACA.15 
Historically, this coverage was relatively more expensive, in part because administrative costs 
were as high as 15-20 percent of total costs. Individuals deemed risky were declined coverage.16 
As many as three in five people who applied for policies before the ACA could not afford the 
high premium prices or were denied coverage, and many people remained uninsured or 
underinsured. 17 
 
B. The ACA and the Individual Insurance Market 
 
 
12 Id. at 83.  
13 Health Insurance Coverage of the Total Population, KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION (2017), 
https://www.kff.org/other/state-indicator/total-
population/?currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22sort%22:%22asc%22%7D.  
14 Timothy S. Jost, Access to Health Insurance and Health Benefits, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF U.S. HEALTH LAW 
PG (I. Glenn Cohen, Allison K. Hoffman, and William Sage, eds. 2017).  
15 Paul Fronstin, Sources of Health Insurance and Characteristics of the Uninsured: Analysis of the March 
2009 Current Population Survey, EBRI ISSUE BRIEF No. 334, Sept. 2009, at 5. 
16 See, e.g., Melinda Beeuwkes Buntin et al., The Role of the Individual Health Insurance Market and 
Prospects for Change, HEALTH AFF. 79, 81 (2004); SARA R. COLLINS ET. AL., THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, SQUEEZED: WHY 
RISING EXPOSURE TO HEALTH CARE COSTS THREATENS THE HEALTH AND FINANCIAL WELL-BEING OF AMERICAN FAMILIES 3-4 (2006). 
17 Michelle M. Doty et al., Failure to Protect: Why the Individual Insurance Market Is Not a Viable Option 
for Most U.S. Families, COMMONWEALTH FUND PUB. no. 1300, 2009, at 1-3.  
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In the year before the ACA’s passage, 16.3% of Americans were uninsured, including 
18.4% of people under age 65, and many more were underinsured.18 The goal of the ACA was 
to fill in the gaps between public coverage and ESI through two primary mechanisms: expansion 
of the Medicaid program to more poor Americans and regulation of the individual market to 
make it a source of affordable and meaningful coverage for everyone else without ESI or public 
coverage.  
 
Here is where the public option came into play.  
 
The ACA’s strategy relied heavily on getting more people enrolled in private health 
insurance, for reasons both political and pragmatic.19 Yet, the individual market was 
inhospitable to the goals of universal access and affordability, and early architects of the 
Obama reform had two responses to discipline the private insurance companies in this market: 
(1) regulate them and (2) create competition through a public option.  
 
The first required a federalization of heath regulation and a complicated, multipronged 
approach. Prior to the ACA, most health insurance regulation, especially of the individual 
market, occurred at the state level, and there was little of it.20 The ACA created federal rules for 
individual insurance, drawing lessons from the 2006 health reform in Massachusetts. Insurers 
were required to issue insurance to any applicant (“guaranteed issue”).21 Medical underwriting 
was prohibited, and insurers could not consider pre-existing conditions in determining eligibility 
or price.22 In fact, premiums for a policy were allowed to vary based on only four factors: age, 
geography, family size, and tobacco use status.23 Even if an insurer devised a way to cherry-pick 
out healthier applicants, the law intended to disgorge any resulting profits through reinsurance 
 
18 DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SEC’Y FOR PLANNING AND EVALUATION, OVERVIEW OF THE 
UNINSURED IN THE UNITED STATES: A SUMMARY OF THE 2011 CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY (2011), 
http://aspe.hhs.gov/health/reports/2011/cpshealthins2011/ib.shtml.  
19 Politically many believed no law would have passed without the support of—or at least without active 
opposition from—the insurance industry. During the Clinton reform efforts, a coalition of health insurers, under 
the name Health Insurance Association of America (HIAA), financed negative advertising campaigns that hampered 
reform. JACOB S. HACKER, THE ROAD TO NOWHERE: THE GENESIS OF PRESIDENT CLINTON’S PLAN FOR HEALTH SECURITY 145-46 
(1997). (The HIAA is now part of the group called America’s Health Insurance Plans). How large of a negative 
impact these ads had is debated. See Paul Starr, What Happened to Health Care Reform? 20 AMERICAN PROSPECT 20 
(1994). In one now iconic advertisement, a couple named Harry and Louise lament that reform would result in few 
insurance choices and increased prices. Coalition for Health Insurance Choices, Harry and Louis on Clinton’s Health 
Plan, YOUTUBE (1994), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Dt31nhleeCg . 
20 McCarran-Ferguson Act, ch. 20, 59 Stat. 33 (1945) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 
(2012)).Only six states required that insurers guarantee issue policies to all applicants, and only one-third of states 
regulated the variability in premium prices allowed among insured. Individual Market Guaranteed Issue (Not 
Applicable to HIPAA Eligible Individuals), KAISER FAMILY FOUND., http://kff.org/other/state-indicator/individual-
market-guaranteed-issue-not-applicable-to-hipaa-eligible-individuals/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2019).  
21 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1201, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg (2012). 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
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and risk-adjustment arrangements.24 And the ACA also regulated benefits, requiring that all 
plans cover preventative care without cost sharing and a set of essential health benefits for 
individual-market plans, and prohibited limits on these benefits for most plans.25 
 
So that these regulations did not exacerbate adverse selection, or the tendency of 
healthier people to wait to buy coverage until they need it, the law included an individual 
mandate that required that most Americans carry health insurance that offers “minimum 
essential coverage,” or else pay a penalty.26 As a carrot, the ACA provided for financial support 
to help lower-income individuals. Anyone who earns from 100 to 400% of the federal poverty 
level ($12,490 to $49,960 for a single person in 2020) and does not have another source of 
adequate insurance, such as through an employer or Medicaid, is eligible for subsidized 
premiums and in many cases also cost-sharing reductions to help pay for their out-of-pocket 
share of costs.27  
 
C. The ACA’s (Foregone) Public Option 
 
In case the nearly 200 pages of the ACA devoted to the endeavor of regulating private 
insurance to achieve broader policy goals fell short, there was a second strategy: create 
competition through a public option.  
 
The idea was to develop a public health plan, based either loosely or very closely on 
Medicare, that would compete with private health plans in the exchanges—new marketplaces 
where people would go to compare and buy health insurance policies.  The public option was 
described by its proponents as simply one option among many, a public health insurance plan 
that would compete side-by-side with private plans and would win if the private options were 
not good enough. Presumably, if the public option offered a similar or better product for lower 
prices, people would choose it. As Jacob Hacker suggested: “public plan choice gives Americans 
the opportunity to choose for themselves how they value the strengths and weaknesses of a 
public, Medicare-like plan and competing private health plans.”28 
 
24 Id. at § 1341-42, 42 U.S.C. § 18061-62 (2012). These provisions of the ACA are not working as smoothly 
as envisioned in early years of implementation because the contributions from insurers intended to cover these 
payments have fallen well short of the amount CMS owes insurers in claims. Timothy Jost, Risk Corridor Claims by 
Insurers Far Exceed Contributions, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Oct. 1, 2015), 
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2015/10/01/implementing-health-reform-risk-corridor-claims-by-insurers-far-
exceed-contributions/.  
25 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1302, 42 U.S.C. § 18022; Id. at § 1001, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-11 
(2012), 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13 (2012).  
26 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1501, 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (2012). Some people are 
exempted from the penalty for reasons including religious objection or affordability, defined as when premiums 
cost over eight percent of household income. Id. 
27 Id. at § 1401, 26 U.S.C. § 36B (2012) (providing for “premium tax credits”); Id. at § 1402, 42 U.S.C § 
18071 (2012) (providing for “cost-sharing reductions”). The employer plan must be “adequate” and “affordable.” 
Adequate is defined as an actuarial value of at least 60% and affordable is when the employee’s share of premium 
cost is under 9.5% of her income.  
28 Hacker, supra note 4, at 2.  




But this idea faced staunch resistance. Even advocates of market-based policy fought 
back, both on the details and on the concept as a whole. The public option was cast aside. Yet 
imagine for a moment that Congress had included a public option as part of the ACA. Would the 
world look different than it does today, and how?  
 
III. Envisioning an Alternate Future: the ACA with the Public Option  
 
Had the public option survived the policy battles leading up to the passage of the ACA 
and become law, it would still have faced an uphill journey to fulfill the potential that Sitaraman 
and Alstott see in competitive public options (offering quality access at controlled prices and 
co-existing with private alternatives). There were two main possible ways health care’s public 
option could have played out, and neither pathway would have fulfilled this vision; each would 
have fulfilled exactly one-half of it.  
 
A. The Two Pathways for a Public Option 
 
The first pathway would have led to everyone enrolling in the public option—what 
Jacob Hacker describes in his chapter as a back door to universal Medicare (Pathway 1). In 
Pathway 1, the public option would be based on Medicare. It would borrow Medicare’s existing 
provider network and negotiated rates. This is the version its architects envisioned. Since the 
plans sold on the ACA’s exchanges are standardized by regulation—they vary little on benefits 
and cost sharing structure—the way plans distinguish themselves is based on network, pricing, 
or perhaps name recognition or brand.  
 
If the public option were built on Medicare’s platform, it would easily have bettered 
private options on these dimensions in most geographies. Medicare has an extensive network 
of providers, who accept lower rates from Medicare than they do from private insurance, which 
pays rates to hospitals that are sometimes 50 percent higher than what Medicare pays.29 
Medicare also controls spending growth better than private plans.30 The divergence between 
what Medicare and private insurers pay is increasing as consolidation among hospitals and 
other providers has enabled providers to demand significant rate increases from private 
plans.31 Plus, Medicare’s administrative rates are lower than those for private insurance, even 
considering that private insurance administrative rates for the individual market are limited 
under the ACA.  All of this means that even if a public option plan paid providers a cut above 
Medicare’s standard negotiated rates, it could offer similar benefits at much lower premium 
prices than private plans with a more comprehensive network of providers. It would simply be 
the better option.  
 
 
29 MEDPAC, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MEDICARE PAYMENT POLICY 14-15 (March 2018).  
30 Id.  
31 Id.  
Revised Draft April 2020 
8 
 
Assuming people understood that the public option was clearly better—an assumption 
that should be taken with a grain of salt for reasons described below—everyone would have 
chosen the cheaper, better public option. Even if people chose only based on premium price, 
which evidence suggests is exactly what often happens on the ACA exchanges,32 the public 
option would have won out. Over time, it would have displaced the private plans altogether 
and become the de facto coverage for anyone seeking a health plan on an ACA exchanges.  
 
Pathway 1 would thus deliver on one half of the competitive public option vision. It 
would have provided guaranteed access at controlled prices, but eventually would not have 
coexisted with private plans at all, at least not side-by-side in a competitive structure.  
 
Interest groups who opposed the public option—including insurers and medical 
providers and suppliers (pharmaceutical and medical device companies) whose reimbursement 
would be lower under Pathway 1—saw the writing on the wall. During the ACA debates, they 
answered the mention of a public insurance plan option with cries of socialism.33 They also 
demanded that if a public option were passed it had to compete without relying on the 
preexisting advantages of Medicare over private insurance. 
 
The second possible way the public option could have, and likely would have, played out 
in the current political environment would have been that these interest groups’ demands won 
out (Pathway 2). Imagine that a public option had to compete on “even ground,” or “break 
even financially” (the latter of which even President Obama asserted34). Although it’s difficult to 
know exactly what that would have meant in practice, at the very least it would have prohibited 
the public option from coasting on the pre-existing Medicare network and negotiated prices. If 
the public option did not have a clear pricing or network advantage—if it were not a clear 
winner—what would that have meant? 
 
B. The Problem of Choice 
 
In some of the examples that Sitaraman and Alstott profile in The Public Option, 
competitive public options are effective because they offer a genuinely meaningful alternative. 
Sometimes this alternative is one that is less expensive, or even free, as compared to pricier 
and probably fancier and more exclusive private options. This is the case with public pools—the 
inspiration for the cover of the print version of the book. Sometimes the alternative is part of a 
tiered system. With the USPS, they suggest, one can get reliable standard mail services, but for 
higher-end packing and shipping needs, Fed-Ex and UPS are the better go-to option. 
 
 
32 AVALERE HEALTH, MORE THAN 2 MILLION EXCHANGE ENROLLEES FORGO COST-SHARING ASSISTANCE (Aug. 19, 2015), 
http://avalere.com/expertise/managed-care/insights/more-than-2-million-exchange-enrollees-forgo-cost-sharing-
assistance [https://perma.cc/22M2-6C23]. 
33 Jacob S. Hacker, The Road to Somewhere: Why Health Reform Happened, 9 PERSP. ON POL. 861, 864 
(2010). 
34 Michael O’Brien, Steele: Public Option is Socialism, THE HILL (Aug. 9, 2009), 
https://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/57825-steele-public-option-is-socialism. 
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The problem with health care’s competitive public option is that in its more politically 
realistic form (Pathway 2), it would not have been easily differentiated in this way, and end 
users would have struggled to see its relative benefit. The public option would have offered 
nearly the same benefits as the private options, likely at a similar price. It might have been 
marginally better under close examination—maybe a better network of providers, maybe some 
extra benefits because of the ability of these plans to operate more slimly, maybe less 
administrative hassle for enrollees (or perhaps not), or maybe it would have provided an easier 
transition to Medicare once eligible. But none of these attributes would have been easy to 
detect, nor would they likely have driven someone’s health plan selection. 
 
The main problem, thus, with any politically-realistic version of a competitive public 
option in health care is the problem of choice. Consumers are notoriously bad at deciphering 
differences among health plans and choosing wisely among them. This should be unsurprising 
when considering the nature of health plan choice. Fundamentally, buying health insurance 
demands having preferences about things that most people have never experienced before, 
like hospitalization or cancer care. Then they have to weigh this risk against spending on other 
goods and services.  
 
Then someone must understand how such preferences translate into health insurance 
policy terms. Most people do not understand the basic features of health insurance plans that 
should shape their decisions—such as how much a plan costs and what benefits are covered.35 
In a survey of insured adults, only 14 percent correctly answered four simple multiple-choice 
questions about cost-sharing features, such as a deductible or copayment.36 However, people 
overestimated their understanding of these insurance concepts, which suggests many would 
not seek help or education even if available. 
 
 
35 Deborah W. Garnick et al., How Well Do Americans Understand their Health Coverage, 12 HEALTH AFF. 
204, 206 (1993) (finding that even though consumers largely understood whether their plans covered 
hospitalization or doctors’ visits, they underreported that their plans covered services including mental health, 
alcohol and drug abuse treatment, or prescription drug and over-reported that their plans covered long-term 
care). 
36 George Loewenstein et al., Consumers’ Misunderstanding of Health Insurance,32 J. HEALTH ECON. 850, 
855 (2013). 
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Furthermore, choosing a health plan requires making calculations regarding deductibles, 
cost-sharing, and premiums that exceed many American’s literacy and numeracy skills.37 Even 
college educated people show surprisingly high levels of error on simple arithmetic tests.38  
 
Even putting aside these challenges, choosing health insurance has all of the telltale 
characteristics that impair rational decisionmaking, sometimes referred to as generating 
cognitive biases. People are overly optimistic about their own health,39 which could prompt 
them to underinvest in health insurance. People also struggle to factor risk into decision-
making—an element central, of course, to health insurance choices.40 This is why young, 
healthy people often forgo buying health insurance, even if it’s cheap. 
 
Documenting the end result of all of these barriers, a volume of empirical work 
illuminates the many ways and reasons that we—regardless of education, income, or smarts—
make poor choices among health plans. As described below, these poor choices persist when 
there is a clear, superior option. These poor choices persist even when options are simplified. 
And they persist even in the face of efforts to help people make better choices through 
decisionmaking supports, or nudges. As one set of researchers behind several studies that 
looked at how to help people make better decisions by simplifying health plan options or 
helping consumers through options concluded: “[T]he main barrier to financially efficient 
choice was not the number of options confronting employees, nor the transparency of their 
presentation, but rather the … lack of basic understanding of health insurance.”41 
 
A few select examples from the many studies showing the extent that we struggle when 
selecting a health plan can illuminate this problem. For example, one study simulated the 
purchase of an ACA plan, using participants who passed a screening test for basic insurance 
literacy.42 Even these more-literate-than-average respondents selected the best choice only 
 
37 Wendy Nelson et al., Clinical Implications of Numeracy: Theory and Practice, 35 ANN. BEHAV. MED. 261 
(2008) (providing an overview of research on health numeracy and the clinical implications for patients); Valerie F. 
Reyna et al., How Numeracy Influences Risk Comprehension and Medical Decision Making, 135 PSYCH. BULL. 943, 
945-46 (2009) (reviewing studies showing links between innumeracy and poor health decisions); Ellen Peters & 
Irwin P. Levin, Dissecting the Risky-Choice Framing Effect: Numeracy as an Individual-Difference Factor in Weighing 
Risky and Riskless Options, 3 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 435 (2008) (showing that lower levels of numeracy led to 
higher loss aversion). On health literacy, see, e.g., ZSOFIA PARRAGH & DEANNA OKRENT, HEALTH LITERACY AND HEALTH 
INSURANCE LITERACY: DO CONSUMERS KNOW WHAT THEY ARE BUYING (2015), http://www.allhealthpolicy.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/01/Health-Literacy-Toolkit_163.pdf (describing health literacy and summarizing studies on 
health and health insurance literacy). 
38 Wendy Nelson et al., supra note 35, at 263. 
39 See Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism about Future Life Events, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 806 
(1980). 
40 See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 
ECONOMETRICA 263, 264 (1979) (showing then people tend to make choices inconsistent with their own expected 
utility when dealing with risky options). 
41 Saurabh Bhargava & George Loewenstein, Choosing a Health Insurance Plan: Complexity and 
Consequences, 314 JAMA 2505, 2506 (2015).  
42 Eric J. Johnson et al., Can Consumers Make Affordable Care Affordable? The Value of Choice 
Architecture, 8 PLOS ONE e81521. 
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about half of the time, and Wharton business school participants got it wrong over one-quarter 
of the time.43  
 
Among enrollees in the University of Michigan’s employee health plan, over one-third of 
workers selected a plan that was identical to another in every way except that it had a more 
restricted provider network.44 No one would be better off enrolled in this plan. Importantly, this 
kind of network size variation is exactly what might differentiate a private and public option on 
a health insurance exchange. Another study of a large U.S. firm found that a majority of 
employees chose a worse option and, as a result, they paid on average 24 percent more than 
they should have on premiums.45 Lower-income employees were more likely to make a bad 
choice.  
 
Similar results occur in Medicare when beneficiaries choose among private prescription 
drug plans. One study found that 73 percent of enrollees could have chosen a plan with lower 
premiums with no risk of spending more on prescription drugs over the course of the year.46 
Another estimated that only about 10 percent of enrollees choose their least-expensive 
option.47 
 
On the ACA marketplaces, a significant share of people choose plans with the lowest 
monthly premiums but that make them ineligible for cost-sharing reductions, which reduce 
their deductibles and copayments when they use medical care. 48 People who select these plans 
will likely spend more in the long run.  
 
Others choose health plans that are not aligned with their own stated medical needs 
and preferences.49 In a study simulating the purchase experience on ACA exchanges, only one-
 
43  Id.  
44 Anna D. Sinaiko & Richard A. Hirth, Consumers, Health Insurance, and Dominated Choices, 30 J. HEALTH 
ECON 450, 453 (2011). 
45 Saurabh Bhargava et al., Choose to Lose: Health Plan Choices from a Menu with Dominated Options, 132 
Q. J. ECON. 1319, 1325 (2017) (“Taken collectively, results from the experiments suggest that the demand for 
dominated plans does not predominantly reflect the informed preferences of consumers or the consequences of 
menu complexity, but instead involves a failure of consumers to accurately evaluate and compare plans.”) 
46 Jason Abaluck & Jonathan Gruber, Heterogeneity in Choice Inconsistencies Among the Elderly: Evidence 
from Prescription Drug Plan Choice, 101 AM. ECON. REV. 377, 379 (2011). They find that individuals consider 
premiums, instead of total out-of-pocket costs, in making decisions. Id. 
47 Florian Heiss et al., Plan Selection in Medicare Part D: Evidence from Administrative Data, 32 J. HEALTH 
ECON 1325, 1377-78 (2013). 
48 Vicki Fung et al., Nearly One-Third of Enrollees in California’s Individual Market Missed Opportunities to 
Receive Financial Assistance, 36 HEALTH AFF. 21 (2017); AVALERE HEALTH, MORE THAN 2 MILLION EXCHANGE ENROLLEES 
FORGO COST-SHARING ASSISTANCE (Aug. 19, 2015), http://avalere.com/expertise/managed-care/insights/more-than-2-
million-exchange-enrollees-forgo-cost-sharing-assistance.  
49 Andrew J. Barnes et al., Determinants of Coverage Decisions in Health Insurance Marketplaces: 
Consumers’ Decision-Making Abilities and the Amount of Information in their Choice Environment, 50 HEALTH SVCS. 
REV. 58, 67 (2014) (finding in a simulation based on purchasing actual ACA exchange plans that 40 percent of 
respondents choose a plan that would cost them at least $500 more than another option, based on their self-
reported health needs).  
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third of respondents chose the cost-minimizing plan, based on their own anticipated medical 
care need.50 Forty-three percent over insured, on average overspending by 24% or $1324 on 
premiums, and nearly a quarter underinsured.51 The authors of this study estimated that if all 
people buying plans on the ACA exchanges had similar error rates as the study population, “the 
result would be roughly $7.1 billion of excess spending each year, borne by a population with 
low to moderate incomes.”52  
 
This quick and only partial yet representative review of research on health plan 
selection is simply meant to illustrate that if the public option were not an obvious best 
alternative—and probably even if it were—people would not necessarily select it. If, in turn, the 
public option failed to gain significant market share, it would not exert pressure on the private 
insurers to offer better quality or lower-priced plans.  
 
Thus, in the end of the day, the public option would co-exist with private plans. Yet, it 
would not serve the other promise that Sitaraman and Alstott see in competitive public 
options, that of ensuring guaranteed universal access at controlled prices. 
 
That’s not to say that having an undifferentiated public option would have no benefit. 
There are 37 percent of counties where only one private insurer participates, which results in 
17 percent of enrollees having only one choice of insurer.53 In these regions, evidence suggests 
health plans have higher premiums.54 In these areas, the mere presence of a public option 
might hold down premiums and premium growth. Such benefits are laudable, but far short of 
the transformative vision that the public option’s architects had for it.  
 
Further, the marginal gains from a competitive public option would have come at a cost. 
The public option would have further justified preserving the existing system and problems 
with it. Injecting this option into the existing ACA exchanges would perpetuate, and perhaps 
even validate, this structure that is causing fundamental problems of inequity and regulatory 
bloat in health care. 
 
C. The Problem of Market-Based Bureaucracy  
 
This regulatory bloat is the beginning of the more structural problems with a 
competitive health insurance public option. While the promise of markets is that they are 
 
50 Saurabh Bhargava et al., The Costs of Poor Health (Plan Choices) & Prescriptions for Reform, 3 
BEHAVIORAL SCI. & POL’Y 1 (2017). This study varied plans only by cost. It told respondents that benefits were equal 
among plans and did not mention network differences. Id.  
51 Id. at 7-8. 
52 Id. at 10. 
53 RACHEL FEHR, CYNTHIA COX, & LARRY LEVITT, KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, INSURER PARTICIPATION ON ACA 
MARKETPLACES 2014-2019 (2018), https://www.kff.org/health-reform/issue-brief/insurer-participation-on-aca-
marketplaces-2014-2019/. 
54 Jessica Van Parys, ACA Marketplace Premiums Grew More Rapidly in Areas with Monopoly Insurers than 
in Areas with More Competition, 37 HEALTH AFF. 1243 (2018). 
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nimble and less bureaucratic than direct regulation, market-based approaches to health 
insurance have produced exactly the opposite: massive regulatory scaffolding to establish 
choice infrastructure and ongoing technocratic tinkering to try to fix the market’s flaws and 
poor decisionmaking. Elsewhere, I’ve called this reality health care’s market bureaucracy.55  
 
The ACA’s exchanges have cost billions of dollars and have demanded extensive 
regulatory investments and, at the end of the day, only provide coverage to 10 million people, 
less than 3 percent of the population.56 The federal government spent nearly 5 billion dollars on 
state grants to establish exchanges and continues to spend 1-2 billion dollars annually to 
operate healthcare.gov, the federally-funded exchange.57 The effort to overhaul healthcare.gov 
after it failed to work on its initial launch cost $1.7B, compared in an initial budget of $93.7M.58  
 
States with their own exchanges must fund a large part of their ongoing operations. 
California estimated it would spend $534 million, excluding federal grants, by the end of FY2017 
on administration of Covered California with ongoing annual costs of over $350 million, funded 
out of plan assessments.59 Even a smaller state like Vermont will spend about $50 million 
annually to run its state exchange.60 
 
Costs also include opportunity costs. The efforts needed to bolster and refine the 
exchanges has consumed health insurance regulators—at both the state and the federal level. 
They have commanded oversized technocratic analysis of exchanges and their successes and 
shortcomings, with some of the most talented researchers and think tanks consumed by this 
task.61  
 
For example the Department of Health and Human Services proposed, revised, and 
issued hundreds of pages of federal regulations to implement the exchanges.62 From the 
 
55 Allison K. Hoffman, Health Care’s Market’ Bureaucracy, 66 UCLA L. REV. (2019). 
56 Six Years of ACA Exchange Effectuations in One Graph: 2014-2019, ACASIGNUPS (Aug. 13, 2019), 
http://acasignups.net/19/08/13/six-years-aca-exchange-effectuations-one-graph-2014-2019 (reporting about 10 
million ACA exchange effectuations, meaning monthly enrollments for someone who both selected a plan and paid 
for it, effectuating enrollment). 
57 ANNIE L. MACH & C. STEPHEN REDHEAD, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, FEDERAL FUNDING FOR HEALTH INSURANCE 
EXCHANGES (Oct. 29, 2014), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43066.pdf.  
58 The Failed Launch of www.healthcare.gov, HBS DIGITAL INITIATIVE, https://rctom.hbs.org/submission/the-
failed-launch-of-www-healthcare-gov/ (last visited March 2, 2019).  
59 COVERED CALIFORNIA, PROPOSED FISCAL YEAR 2018-2019 BUDGET 3 (May 7, 2018), 
https://board.coveredca.com/meetings/2018/05-17/CoveredCA_2018-19_Proposed_Budget-5-17-18.pdf. 
60 Department of Vermont Health Access (DVHA) Budget Document, State Fiscal Year 2016, at 88. 
61 See Allison K. Hoffman, Cost-Sharing Reductions, Technocratic Tinkering, and Market-Based Health 
Policy, 46 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 873 (2019) (offering one example of such analysis with respect to cost-sharing 
reductions). From 2010-mid 2017, a constant stream of research studies and news articles obsessed over the 
functioning of the exchanges. For example, New England Journal of Medicine published 35 articles focused on the 
exchanges, Health Affairs 280 articles that mention and 140 that focus on the exchanges, and over 800 law review 
articles have discussed the exchanges, 250 of which focus on them in depth. Original research (on file with author). 
62 As one example, the 2019 annual ACA exchange market rule received over 400 comments, about one-
third of which came from industry participants, including Anthem, PhRMA, and DaVita. HHS Notice of Benefit and 
Revised Draft April 2020 
14 
 
passage of the ACA through the end of the Obama Administration, the Centers for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services (CMS) promulgated 24 new rules and generated 64 guidance documents 
with respect to the exchanges alone.63 An entirely new office, the Center for Consumer 
Information and Insurance Oversight, was established within CMS in part to implement them.64 
In parallel, state regulators have been doing the same.  
 
Even more, sociologically, this labored creation and preservation of a market-based 
structure reinforces the idea that choice of health plan is sacred and should be a primary goal, 
even if the choice of plan it enables offers little meaning or value. By becoming part of this 
market bureaucracy, the public option would reinforce the value that is at its very core: choice 
defined in a narrow, micro-economic sense. Ironically, as compared to public options in other 
domains like swimming pools or shipping services that can improve access or quality, a public 
health insurance option would perpetuate prioritizing choice as a value over high-quality, 
universal, and affordable access. In some domains, as Sitaraman and Alstott assert, a 
competitive public option might simultaneously advance values of equity and freedom or 
autonomy, but when it comes to health insurance and when freedom is defined as market 
choice, these two value are at odds.  
 
IV. A More Transformative Path and Three Models of Non-Competitive Public 
Options for Health Care 
 
Even though the ACA-style competitive public health insurance option is certain to 
disappoint, public health insurance can co-exist with private health insurance in achieving 
universal access to affordable health care. But the most productive ways they can co-exist are 
not in a competitive model.  
 
If we think of freedom in collective terms, it can be advanced if a public option enables 
everyone access to health care that would improve life opportunities. With this framing, the 
public option could fill in glaring holes in our current system, or it could be the key to more 
fundamental reform, by replacing the heavy reliance on private health insurance for baseline 
access. 
 
This final section is a brief sketch of more productive ways to employ a public health 
insurance “option.” Many of these ideas have long existed in policy discussions and have been 
 
Payment Parameters for 2019, 82 Fed. Reg. 51052 (Nov. 2, 2017); Cf. Ryan Bubb & Richard H. Pildes, How 
Behavioral Economics Trims its Sails and Why, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1595, 1605 (2014) (“Soft paternalistic measure run 
the risk of being less visible than more traditional regulations and mandates, which could make the political 
dynamics more prone to capture rather than less”).  
63 The Center for Consumer Information & Insurance Oversight: Regulations and Guidance, CENTERS FOR 
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES: CMS, https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Regulations-and-
Guidance/index.html#Health Insurance Marketplaces (last visited Sept. 25, 2019) (counting listings under “Health 
Insurance Marketplaces through calendar year 2016).  
64 The Center for Consumer Information & Insurance Oversight, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES: 
CMS, https://www.cms.gov/cciio/ (last visited July 18, 2017).  
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amplified leading up to the 2020 election, as experts consider the best path forward to achieve 
the dual goals of guaranteed access at controlled prices.  
 
A. Baseline coverage 
 
One way public health insurance and private health insurance can co-exist is with public 
health insurance as a baseline plan to cover basic health needs. This approach is undoubtedly 
the surest way to achieve Sitaraman and Alstott’s vision of what public options can uniquely 
deliver: guaranteed access at a controlled price. A baseline plan is available to all. The 
government sets payment rates for goods and services, working to keep spending as low as 
possible while maintaining sufficient supply of providers. 
 
Health care systems all around the world follow this model, in countries like Canada, 
France or England. The details can take many forms. Benefits can be more or less extensive. 
This, in turn, defines the nature of its relationship with private supplemental coverage that fills 
in what is not covered. Medicare for All is one idea in this mold, and the details would 
determine how the public and private coverage co-exist. A more comprehensive version, like 
the model advanced by Senator Bernie Sanders is not a baseline model because it would leave 
little role for private insurance, but a more politically realistic version would likely look more 
like what other countries do. 
 
Private insurance would thus serve the kinds of roles it does elsewhere—supplemental 
coverage to fill in gaps if the public coverage does not pay for the full costs of care, or 
complementary coverage to cover goods and services not publicly financed at all. For example, 
in the existing Medicare program, original public Medicare is a baseline. It pays on average 
about 60 percent of total health care costs of the enrolled population, and 90 percent of 
Medicare enrollees have a secondary plan to fill in the gaps.65 Current enrollees use private 
coverage in two ways. Some people buy a private supplemental plan, which they layer on top of 
original Medicare. Others choose a private Medicare Advantage plan as a replacement for 
traditional, fully public Medicare, and this privately-administered plan covers everything that 
original Medicare would and fills in the gaps.66 Either way, a lion’s share of health care costs is 
publicly financed, directly or in the form of payments to private Medicare Advantage insurers.  
 
 
65 PAUL FRONSTIN ET AL., EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., NO. 351, ISSUE BRIEF: FUNDING SAVINGS NEEDED FOR HEALTH 
EXPENSES FOR PERSONS ELIGIBLE FOR MEDICARE 3 (2010) (describing that Medicare paid for 64 percent of enrollees health 
care costs in 2007); Ben Umans & K. Lynn Nonnemaker, The Medicare Beneficiary Population 1 (2009) (“Only one 
in 10 beneficiaries relies solely on the Medicare program for health care coverage. The rest have some form of 
supplemental coverage to help with medical expenses.”)  
66 Some enrollees choose private Medicare coverage, known as Medicare Advantage. One-third of all 
Medicare enrollees choose these private plans that fill in cost-sharing gaps and often also pay for some services 
not covered by original Medicare, such as dental or vision care. Gretchen Jacobson et al., A Dozen Facts about 
Medicare Advantage in 2019, KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION (June 6, 2019), https://www.kff.org/medicare/issue-brief/a-
dozen-facts-about-medicare-advantage-in-2019/. 
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A less transformative version of a baseline plan would be to offer a baseline to 
everyone, but to allow certain people to opt-out, on a temporary or permanent basis. A more 
permanent opt-out might allow people with incomes above a certain level to opt for private 
coverage as their primary coverage, as in Germany.67 But as Germany illustrates, this approach 
can be thorny because it invites in inequity in access, where people who opt out might buy into 
the better doctors, quicker access, and higher quality care.  
 
Although a universal baseline approach would best serve the goal of health equity, it is 
the hardest to achieve politically. Efforts at universal, public healthcare financing have been 
proposed and defeated repeatedly in the U.S. over the past century.68 It may prove impossible 
to create a hybrid system with public coverage as a baseline in a country where there is already 
a strongly-embedded private system (although starting from scratch can be done, as Taiwan 
demonstrated). Hybrid systems may work best in domains where the public option exists first 
and the private ones fill in later, as in primary education or libraries. Yet, even then, there are 
significant challenges to maintain a balance between the two when the boundaries of play 
overlap or are not well demarcated. 
 
B. Gap Filler 
 
Another way to use public health insurance productively is as a gap filler for everyone 
who does not have an alternative. For example, Medicare or Medicaid could be made available 
to anyone who do not currently meet the criteria for these programs and who does not have 
quality access to ESI or a subsidized private health insurance plan on an exchange.  
 
A more ambitious version of this idea would be to subsume the ACA’s exchange 
population as well. In the end, half of the population would have private coverage through ESI 
and the other half would have public coverage of some flavor—Medicare, Medicaid, CHIP, VHA, 
and IHS. The public coverage would still vary by program, so it would lack any uniform policy 
characteristic, but it would at least ensure that people did not fall through the cracks and the 
government could attempt to control spending for at least half of the population. In this 
version, public and private would co-exists population wide, with people sorted roughly into 
one or the other. It would offer the flexibility Hacker discusses in Chapter __ and the potential, 
even if small, for private insurance innovation. The greatest challenge would be to ensure that 
the two paths remain equitable. 
 
C. The Creeping Public Option  
 
A compromise between a universal baseline and a gap-filler is to start with gap filling 
and to expand over time. This was the initial vision that the architects of Medicare had in the 
1960s—that it would first cover older Americans and would over time expand to cover the 
 
67 Health Insurance Options in Germany – 2020, How to Germany (Jan. 2020), 
https://www.howtogermany.com/pages/healthinsurance.html. 
68 PAUL STARR, REMEDY AND REACTION (2011) 
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whole population.69 This vision is also what led opponents to universal, public coverage to 
advocate for simultaneous passage of Medicaid.70 They bet (correctly) that once the elderly, 
pregnant women, and children were covered, it would reduce motivation for addition 
expansion of public insurance.  
 
A creeping expansion, however, could still happen now. Candidates in the Democratic 
primaries in 2019, including Kamala Harris and Elizabeth Warren, proposed creeping public 
options. Legislation introduced by Representatives Rosa DeLauro and Jan Schakowsky, and 
informed by Jacob Hacker (Ch ___), proposes to use Medicare first to fill in existing gaps.71 It 
also gives employers the option to enroll their employees in public coverage instead of offering 
ESI. Over time, it envisions Medicare would grow in its reach by enrolling all newborns, which 
over a generation would eventually create a universal baseline program, as described above, 
and could take any of the forms of private and public coexistence described above.  
 
Even if the creep stops short of universal, a public option that covers many Americans 
could improve health equity and the health care system significantly. In fact, the larger and 
more heterogenous of a population a public option reaches, the more durable it will be 
politically and the more people will be invested in its success, as illustrated by high popular and 
political support for Medicare.72  
 
These kinds of proposals for creeping public options recognize the challenge of 
transitioning from the current system to one where a public, baseline option serves a broader 
social function and benefit. They also will face deep resistance from the same parties whose 
livelihood will be threatened or transformed if public insurance expands—namely private 
insurers and providers and suppliers whose reimbursement rates will be squeezed. They may, 
in fact, be no more politically feasible than a direct step to Medicare for All and much more 




A public option that is more than just a cog in a competitive marketplace—a piece of the 
market-based bureaucracy—offers more potential to achieve greater equity and opportunity 
for Americans. In fact, rolling out a public option as part of a neoliberal policy framework is 
somewhat ironic. It seeks to serve particular end goals—ensuring high quality health care at 
controllable prices—while also perpetuating a system that itself has been detrimental to 
achieving these same goals.  
 
That said, pushing the competitive feature aside, enables imagining possible futures 
where public and private stand side-by-side or, more aptly, layered and work together to 
 
69 THEODORE MARMOR, THE POLITICS OF MEDICARE __ (1970).  
70 Id. at __.  
71 Medicare for America Act, H.R. 2452, 116th Cong. (2019). 
72 Mollyann Brodie et al., Medicare as Reflected in Public Opinion, ASA: AMERICAN SOCIETY ON AGING, 
https://www.asaging.org/blog/medicare-reflected-public-opinion (last visited Sept. 25, 2019).  
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ensure equitable and affordable access to medical care that improves people’s life 
opportunities. This imagining is not terribly hard. Countries all around the world manage to 
make it happen in a variety of different models. But getting from our current models, and 
mindsets, to these more equitable ends is no easy lift.  
 
